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Lundberg:THE
Schwinn
and BeyondOF THE RULE OF
SCHWINN AND BEYOND:
SURVIVAL
REASON IN VERTICALLY IMPOSED CUSTOMER AND
TERITORRIAL RESTRICTIONS
By Wilford Lundberg*
THE BEGINNING:

SCHWINN

United States v. Arnold, Schwinn and Company' has been interpreted
to mean that territorial and customer limitations within a vertical arrangemen t are per se violations of the Sherman Act.-2 There is good reason for
the adoption of this view. True, the Government did not contend in its
brief that the restrictions were per se illegal.8 Yet, Justice Fortas' opinion
made clear that the Supreme Court had affirmed a finding by the Trial
Court that a per se violation existed in the case of sales by a manufacturer
to a distributor which were accompanied by territorial restrictions. 4 To
this was added a similar condemnation of customer restrictions. By parting with dominion, title, or risk, the manufacturer loses his right to control disposition of the goods. 5 This opinion came within five years of
White Motor Company v. United States6 where Justice Douglas, speaking
for himself and four of his colleagues had said:
We do not know enough of the economic and business stuff out

of which these arrangements emerge to be certain.

. .

. We need

to know more than we do about the actual impact of these arrangements on competition to decide whether they have such a "pernicious effect on competition and lack any redeeming virtue"
and therefore should be classified as per se violations of the Sherman Act."
*Professor of Law, School of Law, University of Montana.
1388 U.S. 365 (1967).
-Comanor, Vertical Territorial and Customer Restrictions: White Motor and its Afternath, 81, HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1422 (1968). Restraints in Distribution: General
Motors, Sealy and Schwinn, 36 A. B. A. ANTITRUST L. J. 84, 86 (1967). MeLaren, Territorial and Customer Restrictions, Consignments, Suggested Resale Prices
and Refusals to Deal, 37 A. B. A. ANTITRUST L. J. 137, 144 (1968). "... where
a manufacturer sells products to his distributor subject to territorial restrictions
upon resale, a per se violation of the Sherman Act results. . . . the same principle
applies to restrictions of outlets with which the distributors may deal and to restraints upon retailers to whom the goods are sold. . . . it is unreasonable without
more for a manufacturer to seek to restrict and confine areas or persons with whom
an article may be traded after the manufacturer has parted with dominion over
it." United States v. Arnold, Schwinn and Company, supra note 1, at 379. By per
se violation is meant the declaration by the court that a certain act violates the antitrust laws without inquiry into its actual effect upon competition. Territorial and
customer limitations (or agreements to divide markets) have long been held to be
per se violations when practiced among competitors, i.e., in a horizontal situation.
The 1963 Supreme Court decision in White Motor Company v. United States, infra.,
note 6, however, refused to apply the same rule in the case of a vertical arrangement,
that is, in a situation where the restrictions were imposed upon a distributor by a
supplier, two business entities not in competition with one another.
-388 U.S. 365, 368 (1967).
'388 U.S. 365, 376 (1967).
-388 U.S. 365, 382 (1967).
'372 U.S. 253 (1963). See note 2.
-Id. at 263.
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Had the Court learned so fast? Or, was Schwinn merely the "natural, entirely-to-be-expected progeny of the Expediting Act?8 Or, more
significantly, has Schwinn repudiated White Motor?9 The majority opinion distinguished White Motor on the grounds that possible factors relevant to a showing that a restraint is reasonable include the "new product" or "failing company" doctrines, neither of which could be applied
to the Schwinn situation. 10 Furthermore, White Motor continues to be
cited as authority for propositions contrary to the much accepted result
in Schwinn."
Assuming, for the moment, that the Court did in fact give the Government something for which it had not asked-a per se rule against any
territorial and customer restriction imposed upon a customer-what, then,
is left open for the manufacturer by way of imposing ancillary restraints?
First, it seems clear, that "areas of primary responsibility" will not be attacked, particularly since they have been promoted by the Justice Department for so long.12 Secondly, vertical integration by way of internal expansion is open to a manufacturer so long as he does not occupy sufficient
market power so as to engage in a "price squeeze". 13 Corollary to internal
expansion is the possibility of vertical integration through vertical merger.
Problems raised by Brown Shoe and related merger cases make this avenue
extremely hazardous, however . 4 In the third place, Justice Fortas' opinion

8

This is the view of Richard W. McLaren. With the preclusion of Court of Appeals
review of government proceedings for equitable relief, the Schwinn record 23
thick volumes - was filed 60 days before oral argument. The Government's brief
was filed 30 days later, and Schwinn's brief came in just two days before argument. Since the Court adopted the passage of title test, Mr. McLaren maintains
the Court simply threw up its hands at even trying to make a rule of reason analysis
in this situation. McLaren, supra note 2, at 143-144.
'This is most certainly the point of view taken by the dissent. 388 U.S. 365, 389
(1967). See also Orrick, Marketing Restrictions Imposed to Protect the Integrity of
"Franchise" Distribution Systems, 36 A. B. A. ANTITRUST L. J. 63, 64 (1967).
1-388 U.S. 365, 374 (1967).
"Albrecht v. Herald Company, 390 U.S. 145 (1968), 88 S.Ct. 869, 875. In his concurring opinion in this case, Mr. Justice Douglas said: "The case is therefore close
to White Motor Co ..
, where before ruling on the legality of a territorial restrietion in a vertical arrangement, we remanded for findings on 'the actual impact of
these arrangements.' '' Justice Douglas felt that the legality of territorial franchises
must be tried on a factual basis. It should be noted that the use of the word "franchise" is not entirely clear since this was excepted from the effect of Schwinn, infra.,
note 15. It is suggested that franchise must necessarily mean something very close
to customer and/or territorial limitations, infra, note 16.
"Orrick, supra. note 9 at 70.
"This seems to be the lesson of United States v. Aluminum Company of America, 148
F.2d 416 (2d Cir., 1945). "A price squeeze occurs when a manufacturer selling both
the raw material and the finished product is able to set the price of the raw material so high, in relation to the finished product, that it is not possible for purchasers
of the raw material to compete with it." Simon, Dual Distribution, 37 A. B. A.
ANTITRUST L. J. 168, 171 (1968). See also AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 523 1967).
"4Brown Shoe Company v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962). The Brown Shoe ease
did not establish any presumptive rule of illegality, holding that "a merger had to
be functinally viewed, in the context of its particular industry", nevertheless it
invalidated a merger that involved approximately 5% of the national relevant market. It did this, however, after an examination of the market, including structure,
history, and probable future, and noted that the shoe industry was a highly frag-
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explicitly exempted from the operation of Schwinn the "franchise"

when

he said
a manufacturer of a product other and equivalent brands of
which are readily available in the market may select his customers,
and for this purpose he may "franchise" certain dealers to whom,
alone, he will sell his goods."
It has been suggested that a necessary element of the right of "franchise"
is the right to have a location clause. 16 Finally, the manufacturer may
proceed on a true consignment basis. 17 Simpson is not overruled, but it is
confined to "culpable price fixing".' The result of the decision insofar
as its practical impact upon Schwinn was slight, therefor, since 75% of
Schwinn's distribution had been through some type of consignment.
The possibility exists, however, that Schwinn is being exaggerated.
Analysis in the ease was not done in traditional per se language. Indeed,
it appears that only thc result is ostensibly per se illegality without
clearly calling it such. White Motor was carefully distinguished, and
Colgate survived. It is arguable that the per se rule which was applied in
Schwinn was that which arose from Sealy, i. e., territoriality with horizontal characteristes is per se illegal,' 9 even though Justice Fortas recog-

mented one in which local effects were often disproportionate to what would seem
to be the effect as seen from a comparison based upon national statistics. More recent cases - involving horizontal mergers - have adopted a rule of presumptive
illegality based on market shares above a de ininimis level. Adler, Merger Rules and
Supreme Court Economics, 36 A. B. A. ANTITRUST L. J. 4, 6 (1967), United States
v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963), United States v. Aluminum
Company of America, 377 U.S. 271 (1964),

United States v. Von's Grocery Company,

384 U.S. 270 (1966), United States v. Pabst Brewing Company, 384 U.S. 546 (1966).
5
1'Schwinn, supra. note 1 at 376. Justice Fortas cited United States v. Colgate and
Company, 250 U.S. 300 (1919), a case which involved the right of a manufacture]- to
refuse to deal with those who did not follow suggested pricing. This decision has
been greatly narrowed, however, by United States v. Parke, Davis and Company, 362
U.S. 29 (1960) and has often been thought of as dead. 36 A. B. A. ANTITRUST
L. J. 87 (1967).
a manufacturer must be free to appoint an"'MeLaren, supra. note 8, at 144 "...
other to be his dealer at a given place and to agree not to appoint another dealer
within a certain distance. If this were not so, a manufacturer would exhaust his
once lie appointed
which Justice Fortas says he has right of dealer selection a single dealer." Id. at 144-145.
7
1 This exemption seems to fly in the face of Simpson v. Union Oil Company, 377 U.S.
13 (1964) which honored substance over form and caused Justice Stewart to quote
in his dissenting opinion from United States v. Masonite Corporation, 316 U.S. 265,
"So far as the Sherman Act is concerned, the result must not turn on
280 (1942)
the skill with which counsel has manipulated the concepts of 'sale' and 'agency'
but on the significance of the business practices in terms of restraint of trade."
Schwinn, supra. note 1 at 393-394.
"Id. at 380. The Sinipson situation involved a consignment agreement between a supplier aind a distributor. The consignor (Union Oil Co.) retained title to the product
until sold by the consignee and paid applicable property taxes as well. The court,
however, held this arrangement to be a sale and therefore a per se violation since
the agreement also carried price fixing features. In a true consigiment situation, no
violation would occur since the supplier would be dealing legally with his own
product.
"136 A. B. A. ANTITRUST L. .. 89 (1967). United States v. Scaly, Ineorporated, 388
U.S. 350 (1967). In this case, the Court specifically found the existence of a horizontal couspiraev within a corporate entity before applying per se rules to territorial
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nized this as a "truly vertical arrangement".2 0 Furthermore, the handling
of the "failing company" and "new company" doctrines left much to
be desired. 21 This doubt as to whether Schwinn has in fact promulgated a
per se rule in the cast of restrictions on vertical distribution seems worthy
of consideration.
THE AFTERMATH: ALBRECHT
Albrecht v. Herald Company22 was decided on March 4, 1968, nearly
a year after Schwinm. Here, a newspaper carrier who had been assigned
an exclusive territory subject to cancellation if he exceeded a maximum
price schedule sought treble damages against the newspaper publisher who
solicited one-fourth of the carrier's business when the maximum price was
exceeded. Furthermore, the publisher cancelled carrier's route when this
suit was brought, forcing the carrier to sell the route at a profit although
the profit was less than it would have been had all of the carrier's customers been included. The Court, holding for the carrier, applied the per
se rule with regard to price fixing.23 What is most interesting, however, is

the Court's treatment of the defense that maximum prices were set to
blunt the pernicious effects of exclusive territories. The Court merely
stated that the "Court of Appeals was not entitled to assume . . . that

and customer restrictions. The 1919 decision in United States v. Colgate & Co., supra.,
note 15, held a refusal to deal for failure to follow suggested prices not in violation of
the antitrust laws. Parke, Davis, supra., note 15, however, narrowed this holding to
the point that where a supplier acts in concert with another entity - here, a wholesaler - he cannot legally refuse to deal with retailers who refuse to abide by the
supplier's suggested restrictions. Consequently, since almost all suppliers deal through
wholesale outlets in one form or another, the practical implications of Colgate as an
avenue for lawful restrictive selling seem to have evaporated.
20Schwinn, supra. note 1 at 378.
2lThese doctrines - applied often in merger cases - have the effect of softening
the treatment given firms which can show that but for the practice which has been
called into question, they would either fail (and this showing must be buttressed by
a history of significant decline), or that they are new and could not enter the competitive market in another way. Specifically, are these doctrines to be exceptions
to a new per se rule or are they factors to be considered at reaching a conclusion?
If the latter, then the rule of reason is being applied rather than one of per se illegality.
-390 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 869 (1968).
,On this point, there had been considerable doubt as to whether maximum price fixing was per se illegal absent a horizontal arrangement. Kiefer-Stewart Company v.
Joseph E. Seagram and Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951) involved maximum prices,
but the Court found a violation only after looking behind a corporate entity and finding a horizontal conspiracy in much the same way that it handled the Scaly case.
In this case, however, the horizontal conspiracy found to have existed was between
the publisher and two men he had hired to solicit and service the carrier's former
customers. This is tantamount to finding a conspiracy between employer and employee to fix prices. Furthermore, the Court pointed out that a combination might
have existed between publisher and carrier, among the other carriers, or between
the publisher and the customers. Albrecht, supra. note 22 at 872. Justicep Harlan's
dissent took issue with this combination on the grounds that no combination can be
found within a vertical structure (i.e., employer-employee) and the other "possible"
combinations were irrelevant to the carrier's case. The dissent went on to say that
maximum price fixing is done in the interests of the manufacturer-seller, not his customers. Therefore in order to be illegal, a horizontal conspiracy must exist, citing
Kiefer-Stewart. Id. at 877, 878, 879.
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the exclusive rights granted by the respondent (publisher) were valid
S..24, and it did not pass on the legality of the practice since it was not
put in issue before the jury. 25 This opinion was written by Justice White
who was with the majority in Schwinn. Furthermore, a concurring opinion
by Justice Douglas who wrote the majority opinion in White Motor and
who was with the majority in Schvwinn stated that
Whether an exclusive territorial franchise in a vertical arrange-

ment is per se unreasonable under the antitrust laws is a much

mooted question .... The Court quite properly refuses to say whether in the newspaper distribution business an exclusive territorial
franchise is illegal. .

.

. Under our decisions the legality of exclu-

sive territorial franchises in the newspaper distribution business
would have to be tried as a factual issue ...."

Justice Douglas concluded that the case was close to White Motor which
required a finding on the impact of the arrangements before ruling on
27
the legality of territorial restrictions in a vertical arrangement.
While the Albrecht case is esentially an extension of the rule in
Parke, Davis,25 it is interesting that the Court did not apply the rationale
of Schwinn to the question of exclusive territories even though the legality
of this practice had not been raised in the Trial Court. Most certainly
it was a legitimate part of the publisher's defense, and the Court often
has shown no reluctance in giving relief beyond that which is sought.
Schwinn is cited, aside from Justice Douglas' concurring opinion, only
once and that for the proposition, previously stated, that no assumptions
can be made as to the legality of exclusive territories. Surely, if Schwinn
promulgated a per se rule in this area, only one assumption could be
made-that such practices are illegal. The Court was silent, however.
As an

extension

of Park, Davis, however, the importance

of

11d. at 874
'It would seem, however, that the legality of territorial exclusivity must have been
at issue since the publisher's defense rested upon the notion that this was the only
way it could keep a complete monopoly out of the hands of its distributors. Indeed,
Justice Stewart's dissenting opinion points this out when he says "If it was illegal
in the first place for the petitioner to enjoy a conditional monopoly, I am at a loss
to understand how the respondent can be liable to the petitioner for not permitting
him a complete monopoly. Id. at 882. The Court's treatment of the question of
illegality of exclusive territories was not in keeping with its bold approach in Schwinn
where it presumably found a per se violation when not argued by the Government.
2-Albrecht, supra. note 22 at 874-875. As authority for the latter proposition, Justice Douglas quoted extensively from Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246
U.S. 231 (1918), a case which arose out of the peculiar characteristics of the grain
market and which validated a price fixing scheme. This case has not been generally
followed. Additionally, the Schwinn case is cited to the effect that the evidence of
record "elaborately sets forth information as to the total market interaction and
interbrand competition, as well as the distribution program and practices .... "Albrecht, supra. at 874-875. See note 8, supra.
-ild. at 875.
'United States v. Parke, Davis, supra. note 15. This extension is due to the fact
that suppliers who refuse to deal with non-conforming distributors must not deal
through persons who appear to be their own employees even though a wholesaler
is not involved at all. Whatever is left of Colgate after this seems unworthy of mention.
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Albrecht cannot be overstated. It appears to make inroads upon the traditional immunity held by sellers who instruct their employees as to prices
and customers-an immunity essential to the normal operations of the
business community. But the silence of the Court viz a viz the Schwinn
rationale poses the distinct possibility that either the Court does not intend to go any further than that case narrowly held or that the Court in
Schwinn was really speaking in terms of territoriality with horizontal
characteristics as it did in Scaly. 9 In any event, Albrecht does not represent the kind of extension of Schiwin that was feared to result at the
30
earliest opportunity.
THE DESTRAPII ITY OF1,A PER SE RULE
A per se rule condemning sales as well as consignments with territorial or customer restrictions has been hailed as the best way to preserve
Col] petitive behavior at the dealer level and thereby discourage product
differentiation."1 Since intra-brand competition is destroyed through such
restrictions, inter-brand competition takes the form of making products
less and less reactively interchangeable.32 While it is true that lower retail
prices-a desirable competitive result-are preferred by single-firm monopolies as a way of maximizing profits, the more common situation in
the business community is oligopolistic. Therefore, it can be argued that
the manufacturer's best interests are served by higher markups at the
dealer level which in turn encourage the services and showrooms that
33
lead to product differentiation-all at the expense of the consumer.
Since this can be the ultimate result of customer and territorial limitations, such limitations seem without justification..3 4 This theory, however
interesting, is not without its answer, however. Professor Bork maintains
that the power to differentiate creates an incentive for others to follow
suit and cut into special markets. "Entry into the field of differentiation
would tend to return the profitability of that activity to the competitive
level. ' ,3-

-Note 19, supra.
'°Orrick, supra. note 9 at 72.
"Comanor,

supra. note 2 at 1422.

By this is generally meant the propensity to make

products different, although not necessarily better, so as not to be truly competitive with one another. Thus, inter-brand competition diminishes, and the public
is denied the benefits of this competition without any commensurate improvement in
the product.
1d. at 1424, 1426.

2

1Id. at 1424.
34Ibid.
"Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 75 YALE L. J. 373, 421-422 (1966) Professor Bork continues: "This effect
does not appear to provide a reason for Sherman Act courts to interfere with price
discrimination, and may suggest the contrary. If product differentiation succeeds,
it is because customers like and respond to it. . . . to save short-run consumer beneThe long
fits might deprive consumers of more substantial long-run benefits ....
run merely refers to the time required for adjustments to new market conditions.
) Id. at 422.
. . . there seems to be no clear reason for a court to interfere ...
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Furthermore, since territorial and customer restrictions tend to
encourage inter-brand competition,36 the absence of such restrictions gives
rise to the "free-ride" problem. If a neighboring member of the group is
allowed to undersell or cut into another's market, local promotion may
become unprofitable. 3 7 Whether or not it is the local distributor or the
manufacturer who should provide these services, however, is at least debatable.38 It would seem that the cost to the consumer would be decreased
if the services were provided locally. There would be less chance of the
provision for unwanted services, and-considering the economics of the
situation-the cost would pass through fewer hands on its way to the
ultimate consumer.
Additionally, the assumption that application of per se rules in vertical-restriction cases will result in vertical integration cannot be taken
lightly.3 9 This seems to be exactly what happened in the case of Schwinn.4 0
Keeping in mind the Brown Shoe case, mergers will not often be possible.
The result, then, will be the destruction of smaller businesses, closing their
avenues of exit. 4 1 It is no doubt true that "economies in distribution result from fully integrated facilities, and these economies may outweigh
the competitive loss resulting from integration' ' 42, nevertheless a "franchise program'' 43 "would seem to be a worthwhile factor in our competitive scheme as an alternative to a centrally owned concern or a ver44
tically integrated manufacturer owning his own distribution system.''
As a general proposition, it hardly seems supportable that the policy of
the Sherman Act is to make bigness a requirement for survival. The application of per se rules simplifies the work of the Court, and it may well
lead to more consent decrees. It does not follow that the results will be
pro-competitive. Indeed, there is little, if any, unanswerable evidence
'Chadwell

and Rhodes, Antitrust Aspects of Dealer Licensing and Franchising, 62

NW. U. L. REV. 1, 5 (1967).
3-Bork, supra. note 35 at 435.
31Comanor, supra, note 2 at 1433.
S'Comanor feels that firms are not likely to integrate since this is: 1) a low profit
activity; 2) distribution frequently involves the purchase and sale of many products,
and 3) distribution is associated with local managerial problems. Id. at 1435.
4037 A. B. A. ANTITRUST L. J. 184 (1968). "'. . . the plain effect of Justice Fortas' opinion is going to be to force manufacturers like Schwinn to vertically integrate."
36 A. B. A. ANTITRUST L. J. 95 (1967).
"AREEDA, supra. note 13 at 536. Mergers have the effect of increasing case of exit,
an attraction to entering the market in the first instance. Absent the possibility of
merger, policies which encourage vertical integration must make exit less attractive
and hence reduce the ease of entry.
'"Comanor, supra. note 2 at 1436.
'The term "franchise program" is taken to mean "the establishment of quasi-independent franchisees subject to various controls respecting his business operations"
Chadwell and Rhodes, supra. note 36 at 1. It may include restrictions respecting
territories and customers.
"Id. at 6. The author cites from the Trial Court Schwinn case 237 F. Supp. 334
where Judge Perry after comparing Schwinn to its major competitor which was
vertically integrated refused to penalize the contract-integrated system of Schwinn.
Further, testimony of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr. is cited for the proposition that
"The disadvantaged citizen's chances of achieving independence are enhanced [b.
franchising]."
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that such an approach is necessary in the area of vertical customer and
territorial restrictions.
CONCLUSION
What seems clear is that the language in Schwinn has not laid to
rest the problem of the application of per se rules in the case of territorial restrictions. Indeed, it will be remembered that Justice Fortas
specifically exempted "franchises" citing Colgate. 45 Furthermore, note
is taken of the "new company" and "failing company" doctrines which
the Court had suggested in White Motor as factors in considering whether
or not territorial restrictions should be per se illegal.46 It is also interesting
that Professor Comanor recommends that new firms or new products be
exceptions to the per se rule, a rule which he feels is warranted and
necessary to prohibit wasteful product differentiation. 47 And Albrecht
cites Schwinn for the proposition that no assumption can be made as to
48
the legality of territorial restrictions.
It is suggested, therefore, that the rule of reason is not dead in
territorial restriction cases within a vertical arrangement. Perhaps
Schwinn, like Chicago Board of Trade, will be narrowly confined, remembering that the decision had the practical effect of applying to only 25%
of Schwinn's distribution business. Considering the voluminous record
filed in the case, Schwivn may well become authority for little more than
outlawing those practices which have a "pernicious effect on competition and lack any redeeming virtue' ' 49, traditional grounds for finding a
per se violation after a factual determination has been made. In determining whether these "pernicious effects" exist, however, the Court should
look to the purpose of the program, the particular restrictions in question,
and the actual impact upon competition.-, Furthermore, since the evidence is great that per se rules will lead to vertical integration, the rule
of reason is needed as a protection for the smaller business unit. It is interesting that Justice F'ortas should have said in 1960:

-388 U.S. 365, 376 (1967).

111d. at 374. It should be noted that Sandura v. Federal Trade Coviwnission, 339 F.2d
847 (1964) is still alive as well. Although a Court of Appeals case, the criterion applied had the effect of exonerating restrictive arrangements when imposed by a small

company seeking to compete against giants in the industry.

47Comanor, supra. note 2 at 1437-1.438.
4
1Note 24, supra.
'"Northern Pacific Railway v.United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
lChadwell and Rhodes, supra., note 36 at 18. The authors continue: "...
a judge
should look upon a program created . . . by small companies to fulfill a need for
aggregating financial

strength,

engaging in joint advertising,

exercising

combined

purchasing power, or sharing engineering or marketing expertise, differently than he
would look upon a progran developed with intent to prevent sales to or by price
discounters. Similarly, a different decision is called for where a franchise prograin has the effect of strengthening interbrand competition, than where the effect
is to eliminate most of the competition that had existed among the largest companies
in an industry."
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small-or smaller business-may have reason to fear that
the Government's current enforcement emphasis may inadvertently
have the effect of insulating our giant companies. from real competition ....
I propose that we remember with something more than
antiquarian interest, the views of Brandeis; and that in the pursuit
of our love for competition by antitrust enforcement, we heed the
warning of Oscar Wilde: "For each man kills the thing he loves."'"

Indeed, it is hoped that such a warning was heeded in Albrecht and
that that case does more than merely raise the haunting specter that in
antitrust cases, the only consistency is that the defendant always loses.5
The re-affirmation of the rule of reason in vertically imposed territorial
or customer restriction cases resulting from Albrecht would mitigate the
53
fear that the Court has stood the Sherman Act on its head.

mFortas, The Grievances of the Small Business Man. -

A Bill of Particulars, 16 A.
B. A. ANTITRUST SECTION 33, 36-37 (1960).
"2The reader will please pardon the author's paraphrasing of Justice Stewart's oftquoted statement from his dissent in United States v. Von's Grocery Company, 384
U.S. 270, 301 (1966): "The sole consistency that I can find is that under §7, the
Government always wins.''
'This was Justice Stewart's statement in dissent. Albrecht, supra., note 22 at 882.
Justice Stewarthowever, confined his remarks to the appropriateness of applying
per se
to vertically
imposed maximum
prices.1968
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